Travel Advice

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: In his Statement to the other place on 1 April (Official Report, col. 1769), my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary (Mr Jack Straw) presented the review of FCO travel advice (Cm 6158), and invited comments from all quarters on its conclusions and recommendations. A number of associations, companies and individuals, many but not all from within the travel industry, responded to this invitation. The Foreign Secretary held a roundtable on 27 May with key stakeholders to discuss further their views on our travel advice service and how it might be improved. We are now in a position to announce to Parliament the revisions which will be made.
	We have discussed at length the difficult question of how we can best inform the public about the threat from terrorism in individual countries. As the Foreign Secretary said in his Statement of 1 April, our travel advice needs to strike a balance between danger and disruption: making public safety its prime concern while minimising the disruption which terrorists want to cause. Our advice must inform people of the threat from terrorism. When the threat is acute, it will inevitably lead to some disruption in travel in the interests of public safety. But at the same time we must make sure we do not do the terrorists' work for them by causing too much of the disruption which they seek.
	We have therefore decided that in future, in the case of intelligence-based terrorist threats, we shall advise against travel only in situations of extreme and imminent danger—if the terrorist threat is sufficiently specific, large-scale or endemic to affect British nationals severely (Option E on page 22 of the review). The factors which we shall consider in reaching this judgment will include the specificity and credibility of the intelligence information, the recent history of terrorist incidents in the area, the likelihood that the threat could affect British nationals, and the level of protection from the threat available to British nationals. One reason for making this change of emphasis is to maintain the credibility of our advice. We are concerned that many people continue to travel despite our warnings against all but essential travel. The public will be better served if such warnings are used more sparingly. I should add that we shall continue to prescribe against travel in cases of non-terrorist threats (coups, civil unrest, natural disasters) on the same basis as before.
	We have also decided to accept the recommendation on page 28 of the review to establish a standing advisory council of travel advice users. Details of membership, timing and agenda are still to be finalised, but the council would bring together representatives of the travel and insurance industries, NGOs and others to advise on issues arising from travel advice and its implementation. It would not be consulted on individual travel advice changes, which would continue to be the responsibility of officials and, ultimately, myself.
	We have also asked officials to implement a number of recommendations from the review, and from the subsequent consultation, to make the travel advice pages clearer and easier to use. Although we have achieved considerably greater clarity over the past year, further refinements have been suggested to ensure that those who consult the FCO website or the telephone call centre take away the key points.
	One fact that has emerged clearly from the review is that, while our travel advice service is heavily used, many different types of customer use it for widely varied purposes. Inevitably, we cannot satisfy all the demands, some of which are mutually exclusive, but I am confident that the adjustments outlined above will improve the overall quality of service and level of customer satisfaction.

Iraq: Roulements of UK forces in Multinational Division (South-East)

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	As part of the routine management of UK forces in the Multinational Division (South-East) (MND(SE)) in Iraq, we intend to conduct a further roulement over the coming months. The lead UK formation, currently 1 Mechanised Brigade, will be provided by 4 Armoured Brigade from October 2004. In addition to 4 Armoured Brigade's headquarters and signals squadron, we plan to replace the major units currently in Iraq as follows:
	
		
			 Unit deploying Unit currently in theatre 
			 4 Armoured Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron 1 Mechanised Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron 
			 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards The Household Cavalry Regiment 
			 The Royal Dragoon Guards The Queens Royal Lancers 
			 4th Regiment The Royal Artillery 1st Regiment Royal Horse Artillery 
			 1st Battalion The Scots Guards lst Battalion The Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment 
			 1st Battalion The Welsh Guards 1st Battalion The Royal Welch Fusiliers 
			 1st Battalion The Duke of Wellington's Regiment 1st Battalion The Cheshire Regiment 
			 21 Engineer Regiment 22 Engineer Regiment 
		
	
	This process of roulement is currently planned to take place over the period from mid-October to mid-November. We expect that 4 Armoured Brigade Headquarters will assume authority in early November. We expect that the number of Armed Forces personnel in theatre will remain broadly stable as a result of these changes.
	In my Statement on 27 May (Official Report, col. 1725) I announced that we were reducing the notice to move of 40 Commando The Royal Marines, in case it proved necessary to deploy it to help to continue the work currently carried out by the two surge battalions, the 1st Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 1st Battalion The Royal Highland Fusiliers. These battalions have carried out much impressive work particularly in developing Iraqi security forces. However, the general officer commanding has concluded that there will be a continuing requirement for some surge capability in MND(SE), both to provide support to Iraqi security forces in the early stages of the transitional period, and to provide capacity for some other tasks, including the protection of essential infrastructure over the summer period.
	As I announced in that Statement, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders will complete their six-month tour in July. Three companies of the Royal Highland Fusiliers were originally deployed for a three-month tour to mid-July (the other company forms the Falkland Island Roulement Infantry Company). We have concluded that we should not extend their tour in Iraq any further. On the advice of the general officer commanding, therefore, I have decided that 40 Commando should deploy to replace the Royal Highland Fusiliers. Because all four companies of 40 Commando will deploy to Iraq there will be a net increase of approximately 270 personnel in theatre, which will bring the total to around 9,200. We envisage that deployment will begin on 21 June in order to complete the handover in mid-July.
	As part of the roulement from 1 Mechanised Brigade to 4 Armoured Brigade, and in line with our policy of employing the reserves as an integral component of the Armed Forces, we shall shortly begin mobilising a further tranche of approximately 750 Reservists to support operations in Iraq, with a view to deployment from mid-October onwards. This is a smaller deployment than previously required for Op TELIC. We currently have some 1,400 Army Reservists carrying out a range of activities including medical support, force protection duties and providing individual reinforcements to units. We anticipate that most of these tasks will continue but the reduction in the number of individual reinforcements required and the replacement of the reserve field hospital with one staffed by regular soldiers will reduce the total Reserve requirement. These changes mean that the number of Army Reservists in theatre will drop to about 1,050 at the start of the roulement (about 13 per cent of the land component) and then further reduce to about 750 over the following months.
	We aim to issue the call-out notices in two tranches on 23 July and 27 August and begin deployment in mid-October. Reservist personnel will receive at least 21 days' notice. Mobilisation will be followed by a period of individual, pre-deployment and collective training, integration into receiving units, and then a short period of pre-deployment leave. The majority of those called out can expect a deployed tour of six months and a total period of mobilisation, including post-tour leave, of about nine months, though for a few it may be longer.
	Between now and 23 July we aim to identify for selection as accurately as possible those Reservists who are believed to be fit and available for deployment. As is customary, to ensure that we successfully mobilise the required number, we will need to issue a greater number of call-out notices than the actual requirement.
	I would emphasise that these are routine adjustments to UK forces in MND(SE). We continue to consider, with our partners in the multinational force, the levels and dispositions of forces required in Iraq in the months ahead, to support the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq through the process leading to the election of a Transitional Assembly and Government early in 2005. If we judge that further changes to the UK military contribution in Iraq would be appropriate to support this process, we will of course inform the House at the earliest opportunity. At present, however, no such decision has been made.

European Defence Agency

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	The General Affairs and External Relations Council of the European Union agreed on 14 June to the establishment of a European Defence Agency in the fields of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. The agency will make a major contribution to the development of the military capability of EU member states, a key UK objective for the European security and defence policy. By rationalising and harmonizing capability requirements, and linking those directly to industrial and research efforts, it will help to improve the military effectiveness of European nations which will benefit both the EU and NATO. The work of the agency will be directed by a steering board consisting of national Defence Ministers to ensure that it is subject to appropriate national control as well as being given the necessary political impetus.
	The Government regret that it was necessary to agree to the establishment of the agency, through a scrutiny override, before parliamentary scrutiny had been completed and before the debate, recommended by the European Scrutiny Committee on 9 June (22nd report, 2003–04, HC42-xxii), could be held. The United Kingdom did not wish to prevent the decision to establish the agency being taken at the Council meeting given the benefits expected from the creation of the agency and the influential role played by the United Kingdom in shaping and implementing its formation. I wrote to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee on 10 June setting out this position. The Government are, none the less, fully committed to the need for national parliaments to have proper oversight of EU issues and the establishment of the European Defence Agency will be debated in European Standing Committee B on 22 June.

Northern Ireland: Forces under Command of General Officer Commanding

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	As part of our normal process of keeping force levels under review, the GOC Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Chief Constable of the PSNI, has concluded that two of his units (not routinely based in Northern Ireland) can be removed from his command as they are not required for routine support to the police in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, two battalions which have been rear-based outside Northern Ireland since December 2003 and February 2004, will transfer to the command of CinC Land on 16 July 2004.
	This is a prudent measure based on the GOC's and Chief Constable's assessment of the current security situation and the success of the PSNI in dealing with the threat from terrorism with reduced military support. It does not affect the Army's ability to support the PSNI in countering the threat from terrorism and preventing potential public disorder. We will continue to keep force levels in Northern Ireland under regular review to best deliver the support required by the PSNI.

British Forces Post Office:Key Targets 2004–05

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	Key Targets have been set for the chief executive of BFPO for financial year 2004–05. The targets are as follows:
	Key Target 1: To provide a guaranteed 100 per cent absolutely secure Defence Courier Service for the carriage of protectively marked material (PMM).
	Key Target 2: To provide a secure Defence Courier Service for the carriage of protectively marked material (PMM) operating within timescales for scheduled and special items at not less than 98.7 percent of that agreed with customers.
	Key Target 3: To provide a resilient and dependable service for the controlled and specialised handling of defence official mails by operating at least 96 per cent of deliveries within scheduled timings, agreed with customers.
	Key Target 4: To meet 96 per cent of the requirements negotiated and agreed with customers for the transit times for delivery and collection at defence mail centres.
	Key Target 5: To meet 95 per cent of the agreed customer requirement for the movement of private and official mails from BFPO London to authorised overseas destinations within agreed timescales.
	Key Target 6: To achieve an overall 2 per cent increase in efficiency.

Toft Report

Lord Warner: My honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Public Health (Miss Melanie Johnson) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement today.
	In July 2002, the Government's Chief Medical Officer, Sir Liam Donaldson, commissioned Professor Brian Toft to investigate the circumstances surrounding four adverse events that had occurred in the reproductive medicine units at the Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust. This followed reports of a mix-up in treatment that led to mixed-race twins being born to a white couple.
	Professor Toft's report is published today. He concludes that a mixture of inadvertent human error and systems failure was involved.
	He makes a number of recommendations for the trust, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the department. He also recognises that significant progress has already been made to address the issues his recommendations raise.
	Responses by the trust, the HFEA and the department to the recommendations directed specifically at them are also published today.
	The Government recognise fully the distress that these mistakes and failings have caused to patients and their families, and the importance of ensuring that lessons are learnt to minimise the likelihood of them happening again. We are grateful to Professor Toft for a thorough investigation, and welcome his report.
	Copies of Professor Toft's report and the responses to it by the trust, the HFEA and the department have been placed in the Library.

NHS Continuing Care

Lord Warner: My honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Community (Dr Stephen Ladyman) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement today.
	I am publishing today figures that detail the progress made on investigations into cases where individuals may have been inappropriately denied National Health Service care.
	Strategic health authorities have been required to investigate cases where individuals may have been inappropriately denied fully funded NHS continuing care since 1996. Where investigations have revealed that care should have been provided the NHS has been recompensing, or will recompense, individuals for the cost of that care. This process has formed part of the department's response to the Health Service Ombudsman's report into long-term care, which was published in February 2003.
	The process began with each SHA reviewing and aligning the criteria for NHS continuing care within its area and ensuring that these criteria conformed with the legal position.
	The department requested that investigations, as far as possible, were completed by 31 March 2004. The number and complex nature of new cases presenting themselves during the three months from January to March 2004 posed significant challenges to meeting that deadline, but the NHS has remained committed to completing investigations as accurately and thoroughly as possible. At the end of March the NHS had completed 57 per cent. (6,713) of all outstanding investigations. This number is greater than the number of cases which the NHS was aware of at the end of December 2003, and demonstrates the NHS's commitment to completing cases promptly once they are received. The department will check that those cases outstanding at the end of March have been completed as of the end of July. From then onwards I will expect any cases to be completed within two months of all the information on the case being received by the SHA. The situation in each SHA is summarised in the table.
	Following the work carried out by SHAs in reviewing, revising and investigating the provision of fully funded NHS continuing care, awareness and application by the NHS is improving. The NHS expects to pay a total of over £180 million when all the cases received by the end of March 2004 have been investigated and restitution made for incorrect decisions. There is a timely appeal process for current cases, so that the need for a retrospective recompense process will decline.
	
		
			 SHA Name Number of cases eligible for recompense Investigations completed Investigations under way 
			 Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire SHA 0 281 370 
			 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire SHA 34 102 110 
			 Essex SHA 10 146 26 
			 North West London SHA 10 181 191 
			 North Central London SHA 8 64 61 
			 North East London SHA 0 169 11 
			 South East London SHA 60 183 90 
			 South West London SHA 62 194 21 
			 Northumberland, Tyne & Wear SHA 27 126 172 
			 County Durham and Tees Valley SHA 10 48 178 
			 North & East Yorkshire & North Lincs SHA 29 266 93 
			 West Yorkshire SHA 25 130 219 
			 Cumbria and Lancashire SHA 15 154 186 
			 Greater Manchester SHA 5 102 240 
			 Cheshire & Merseyside SHA 107 774 422 
			 Thames Valley SHA 4 181 202 
			 Hampshire and Isle of Wight SHA 30 386 121 
			 Kent and Medway SHA 24 186 44 
			 Surrey and Sussex SHA 5 15 860 
			 Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire SHA 43 612 349 
			 South West Peninsula SHA 25 433 120 
			 Dorset and Somerset SHA 14 448 467 
			 South Yorkshire SHA 138 232 78 
			 Trent SHA 0 236 79 
			 Leics, Northants and Rutland SHA 29 202 22 
			 Shropshire and Staffordshire SHA 38 412 19 
			 Birmingham and The Black Country SHA 10 213 73 
			 West Midlands South SHA 8 237 187 
			 Total-England 770 6,713 5,011

Cambodia: Adoptions

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My honourable friend the Minister for Children (Margaret Hodge) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement:
	I am announcing a temporary suspension of adoptions of Cambodian children by UK residents.
	The temporary suspension is being introduced in response to concerns raised by and investigated by officials from the DfES who visited Cambodia, by the British Embassy in Cambodia and, separately, by other stakeholders about the intercountry adoption process in Cambodia.
	I believe that the safeguards in the Cambodian adoption system are currently insufficient to prevent children being adopted without proper consents being given by their birth parents and improper financial gain being made by individuals involved in the adoption process.
	The specific areas of concern include:
	Evidence relating to the systematic falsification of Cambodian official documents related to the adoption of children;
	Evidence relating to the extensive involvement of adoption facilitators in the adoption procedure in Cambodia even though Cambodian law expressly forbids facilitators participating in the adoption process;
	Evidence relating to the procurement of children for intercountry adoption by facilitators, including by coercion and by paying birth mothers to give up their children and;
	Concern about the prevalence of children trafficking and corruption generally in Cambodia.
	The temporary suspension will take effect immediately and will be imposed on all UK applications to adopt children from Cambodia where the prospective adopter has not yet received a matching report from the Cambodian authorities. This is the latest point in the adoption process in Cambodia where a temporary suspension could take effect before a Cambodian adoption certificate is issued.
	Although the UK authorities could intervene where a prospective adopter applies to bring a child into the UK there is a considerable risk that the child might be left in the situation where they have been legally adopted in Cambodia, and as such are no longer an orphan but are unable to enter the UK with their adoptive parents. This would pose a significant risk to the individual child and would clearly be unacceptable.
	I intend to consider reviewing the temporary suspension when the Cambodian Government pass new adoption legislation or if there is another development I consider to be significant, for example if Cambodia were to implement the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption.
	Only in exceptional circumstances will I consider that the temporary suspension should not apply in a particular case. Any decision relating to a particular case will of course take account of what is in the best interests of the child and all the facts of the particular case.